Abstract: An analytical approach is presented to evaluate the impacts of price-sensitive loads on congestion in transmission network. To achieve this aim, the Lagrange multipliers (LMs) of transmission lines' power flow constraints are calculated from independent system operator's social welfare maximisation in which demand-side bidding is considered. It is shown that the LM of each congested line can be decomposed into five components. The first part is a constant value for the specified line, while the next two components are associated to generating units and the last two constitutive parts are related to load service entities (LSEs). The proposed decomposition obtains considerable information regarding the impacts of price-sensitive loads on congestion in transmission network. First, the sensitivity of congestion degree of each congested line to the bidding strategies and maximum price-sensitive demand of LSEs are indicated by weighting coefficients of the last two terms in the decomposed LM. Furthermore, the decomposition of LM to the constitutive components reveals the contribution of each generating unit and LSE to the congestion of corresponding line. The simulation results on a test system confirm the efficiency of the proposed approach.
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Introduction
In a deregulated electricity industry, open access transmission basis yields in more intense utilisation of transmission network by market participants, which consequently, increases the probability of transmission congestion occurrence. Congestion causes the difference in nodes' price and may lead to price volatility and price spikes [1] . All these effects depend on demand responsiveness [2] [3] [4] . Demand response can be defined as 'the changes in electric usage by end-use customers from their normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity' [5] . A wide range of demand response programs exists. Demand bidding can be considered as a subcategory from market-based programs category of demand response [5] . A wide range of literature has focused either on the measurement of load elasticity [6] [7] [8] [9] or on the impacts of price responsiveness of loads on electricity prices in power markets [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . In [15] , an agent-based simulation is employed to study the effects of demand-side bidding in the exercise of monopoly power of generators. Several congestion management methods have integrated the demand participation [16] [17] [18] .
Bompard et al. [1] investigated the impacts of load elasticity on congestion management and pricing. They deduced that the effects of congestion on the market in terms of price and main economic metrics are alleviated as the demand elasticity increases. The influence of shifting the price responsive demand from periods of high price to periods of low price on congestion and locational marginal price is investigated in [19] , although no meter for measuring the impact on congestion is introduced. Reference [20] used electricity demands responsiveness as additional decision variables in the congestion management. Factoring the price elasticity of demand in the optimal power flow (OPF) is presented in [21] . Benefits of demand response for network's operation are studied in [22] [23] [24] . In [25] , an analytic approach for locational marginal price decomposition was introduced in which transmission network congestion and price-sensitivity of loads were ignored. Despite the presented studies on the demand price responsiveness, no analytical models for measuring the impacts of price-sensitive demand side on transmission congestion based on OPF can be found in the literature.
This paper proposes an analytical approach for investigating the impacts of price-sensitive loads on congestion in transmission network. This aim is accomplished in few steps. In the first step, independent system operator's (ISOs) social welfare maximisation is rephrased considering the supply and demand-side bidding. Then, the optimisation problem is solved using Lagrangian relaxation method, and Lagrange multiplier (LM) of transmission lines' power flow is calculated. Afterwards LM corresponding to each congested line is manipulated and decomposed into five components. We have declared that the first component is a constant value for each bus, which is independent from bidding strategies of GenCos and load service entities (LSEs). The second and third components are associated to generating units that include weighted summation of strategies of marginal units and generated power of bounded generating units, that is, units facing their generation caps. The fourth component of LM is the weighted sum of power demanded by fully dispatched LSEs and fifth part is weighted aggregation of bidding strategies of LSEs, which are not completely dispatched. The presented decomposition produces substantial information about the impacts of price-sensitive loads on congestion in transmission network.
Sensitivity of congestion in transmission lines to the maximum demand and bidding strategies of price-sensitive loads are indicated by weighting coefficients of the fourth and fifth term in the decomposed LM, respectively. Moreover, the decomposition of LM to the constitutive components determines the contribution of each GenCo and LSE to the congestion of corresponding line, which obtains helpful signals for system operators to identify the most influential factors on the congestion in network and consequently make proper decision for mitigating the congestion. The experimental results on a test system confirm the capability of the proposed approach.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Problem formulation is presented in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 include the proposed LM decomposition and assessment of price-sensitive loads' impacts on transmission congestion, respectively. The simulation results for a test system are presented in Section 5. Finally, the paper is summarised and concluded in Section 6.
Problem formulation
In this work, a pool-based electricity market is considered in which both GenCos and LSEs submit their hourly bids to an ISO. Another principal trait of the electricity markets is pricing mechanism. In this paper, we focus on the closed auction with non-discriminatory pricing rule, which is the most commonly accepted structure of the spot electricity markets around the world. Assuming the quadratic form for generation cost function of GenCos, the marginal cost function will be in the form of a linear increasing function. GenCos offer a linear supply function to the ISO in which the slope and/or intercept strategically changed with regard to true supply function (marginal cost). In our work, we assume that GenCos only change their strategies by only adjusting the intercept value a i , which is a rational and common assumption [26, 27] . So, GenCos' supply function is expressed as (1) .
We assumed that LSE j's demand is composed of a fixed component (Q Also, we assume that the LSEs adjust their bidding strategies by regulating the intercept of the line (2). Moreover, in order to evaluate the impacts of price-sensitivity of loads on transmission congestion, the ratio R is defined as [28] 
in which the denominator is maximum potential total demand (MPTD). As illustrated in Fig. 1 . By increasing R from zero (100% fixed demand case) to the value one (100% price-sensitive case) the impacts of price-sensitivity became clearer. ISO receives the offers from the GenCos and LSEs, and then settles the market. ISO maximises social welfare while matching supply and demand and satisfying transmission network constraints as expressed in (4) .
The Lagrangian relaxation method is employed to solve the optimisation problem in (4). The corresponding Lagrangian formulation for the maximisation problem (4) can be stated as
Lagrange multiplier (LM) decomposition
Since there is a direct relationship between the transmission congestion and LMs of transmission lines in (4), in this paper the LMs of transmission lines are decomposed and then analysed to evaluate the impacts of price-sensitive loads on transmission congestion. For simplicity and without loss of generality, it is assumed that at the market equilibrium point the directions of the power flow in transmission lines are already known. Therefore, the lower limits of the lines flow in (4) are relaxed and the lines that belong to L cong bind to their maximum permissible line flows. Moreover, it is assumed that at the market equilibrium point, the power generated by units belong to N s are limited to their upper capacity and LSEs belong to N D are fully dispatched (i.e. power demanded by them are limited to their upper limit).
For the optimisation problem (4) with the Lagrange equation described in (5) and based on the DC power flow, Lemma 1 expresses the decomposition of LM corresponding to congested line l (G max l ) into five main components, derived from solving the Karush-KuhnTucker (KKT) conditions for the Lagrange (5) at the market equilibrium point.
Lemma 1: For the specified network topology, and based on the DC load flow, the G max l is obtained as follows
Proof: Lemma 1 is proved in two steps. At the first step, the KKT conditions for the optimisation problem (4) at the market equilibrium point are analysed. At the second step, by manipulating the results of the KKT conditions, the Lemma 1 is proved. KKT conditions for (4) at the market equilibrium point are presented in Appendix. The quantity of power generated by each unit and quantity of price-sensitive load dispatched at each node are given in (7) and (8), respectively.
By substituting (7) and (8) in equality constraint, l is given in (9) . (see (9)) where If there is no congestion in the network, l is the market clearing price and equals the first term in the right-hand side of (9) . From KKT condition associated to binding inequality constraints and after some manipulation which are given in Appendix, the relationship among G max l s, a i s, Q Si , Q S, max Dj and c j s is obtained as (10) . (see (10)) Equation (11) is the vector form of (10) 
in which α, β, C, D, E and F are explained in Appendix in (18) . Therefore the relationship between G max s, a i s, Q S , Q S D and c j s is given by
where a is the vector of strategies of the GenCos, contributing to the price discovery process, c is the vector of strategies of the LSEs which are not fully dispatched, Q S is the vector of maximum generation of the units, bound to their maximum generations and Q S D is the vector of maximum price-sensitive power demanded by LSEs that completely dispatched.
Therefore for the congested line l, according to (12) , the following equation is obtained
where
Thus, the Lemma 1 is proved. □ 4 Assessment of price-sensitive loads' impacts on transmission network congestion
The LM decomposition, expressed by Lemma 1, can be effectively employed by system operator for monitoring the impacts of demand responsiveness on the transmission congestion. According to (6) in Lemma 1, the LSEs have been classified into two groups. The first group consists of LSEs that belong to N D , which are willing to pay more, so they are fully dispatched in market equilibrium. The second group includes the LSEs that belong to N D − N D , in which the bids were lower so that they did not fully dispatch.
Transmission network congestion at operating point is directly influenced by bidding strategies of second group of LSEs. Based on the proposed classifications using a similar approach as in [25] , some critical points can be derived from (6):
1. Term H ′′′ j,l c j represents the contribution of LSE j to the LM associated to congested transmission line l. Furthermore, according to (15) , H ′′′ j,l indicates the variation in the congestion of line l according to the variation in the bidding strategy of LSE j.
www.ietdl.org According to the presented discussions, the coefficients H ′′ j,l and H ′′′ j,l can be employed for effective evaluation of impacts of price-sensitive loads on transmission congestion at market equilibrium. The proposed analytical approach provides a deep insight into the congestion in transmission network and the key factors affecting this phenomenon. Based on the results of this assessment, system operator can diagnose the most influential factors on the congestion in network and consequently make proper decision for mitigating the congestion. This may lead to postponement of the transmission expansion.
Case study
The five-bus transmission grid, which is used here for simulation, is taken from ISO-NE/PJM training manuals, where it is used to illustrate the determination of day-ahead market LMP solutions. The topology of the test system is shown in Fig. 2 . The details of the line capacities, reactance levels and generators cost data are adopted from [29] . The upper limit for flow of line 5 which is linked to bus 3 and bus 4 is decreased from 240 MW to 110 MW, so possibility of congestion is acquired.
The bid and capacity information of generation units and load data are presented in Table 1 . It should be noted that for all simulations MPTD is considered constant. In order to evaluate the impacts of price-sensitive loads on transmission congestion, five values for parameter R are considered (0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1) and market is dispatched for them separately. Generating unit 4 was limited to its minimum generation, which in this simulation is considered 0. Low-cost small-size unit 1 was bounded to its upper capacity limit in all cases except R = 1. Table 2 presents the LM of congested line 5 and contribution of generating units in congestion of this line for different values of R. The LM decomposition results for LSEs and their impact on congestion of line 5 is demonstrated in Table 3 . Based on the presented results in Tables 2 and 3 , the following comments can be made:
As R was raised and consequently price-sensitivity of loads was increased, congestion of line 5 was decreased. Therefore, in case R = 1, there is no congestion. As mentioned earlier, the coefficients H ′′ j,l are not always positive. This means increasing the maximum demand by LSE with tendency to pay more, does not necessarily result in intensification of congestion in transmission network. For instance, in case R = 0.5, if LSE 2 at bus 3 increases its amount of maximum price-sensitive demand, that is, Q S, max Dj by 1 MW and re-dispatch the network, the congestion of line 5 increases by 0.04, 0.19% variation. In the same case, if LSE 3 at bus 4 increases its maximum price-sensitive demand by 1 MW and re-dispatch the network, the congestion of line 5 decreases by 0.0341, 0.16% variation. It must be noted this LM variation could be anticipated by using the values of H ′′ j,l in Table 3 . The coefficients H ′′′ j,l express the ability of LSE j to manipulate the degree of congestion in line l. For instance, in case R = 0.75, congestion of line 5 is highly sensitive to the bidding strategies of LSE 1 at bus 2. It is interesting to note that by increase of bid of LSE 1, the LM of line 5 increases while increment in bid of LSE 3 reduces the G Table 2 , unit 3 is the most influential unit on the congestion of line 5. In addition, according to the demonstrated results in Table 3 , LSE 1 has the largest impact on the congestion of mentioned line.
Conclusion
This paper presented a new analytical approach for assessing the impacts of price-sensitive loads on the transmission lines congestion by decomposing LMs associated to congested lines to constitutive components at market equilibrium. The proposed decomposition of the LM indicates the impacts of the bidding strategies and maximum demand of price-sensitive loads on the congestion in transmission lines. This research demonstrated that in the presence of price-sensitive loads, the LM is composed of five constitutive components. The first component is constant, the second component is the weighted sum of strategies of the unbounded generating units (marginal units) and the third component is the weighted sum of power generated by the units bounded by their generation caps. The fourth component is the weighted sum of demanded power of fully dispatched LSEs, and the last component is weighted aggregation of strategies of LSEs, which are not completely dispatched. The weighting coefficients with regard to each LSE and the LM components of the LSEs for each congested line can be employed by the market operator for efficient evaluation of influences of LSEs on mitigation of the congestion in transmission network. The proposed decomposition and evaluation approach was applied and tested on a five-bus test system. The simulation results illustrated the efficiency of the proposed approach. 
KKT condition for the binding inequality constraints of transmission lines
By substituting Q Si and Q S Dj from (7) and (8) into (16) (18) After replacing l from (9) into (17) and some manipulation, (10) can be attained. Matrices α, β, C, D, E and F from (11) are defined as (see (19) 19) www.ietdl.org 530
